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Abstract 
Natural disasters often have catastrophic risks on insurance companies as well as on the 
insured.  Using a very large dataset on homeowners’ insurance coverage by state, by firm, and by 
year for the 1984 to 2004 period, this paper documents the positive effect on losses and loss 
ratios of both unexpected catastrophes as well as large events that the authors term “blockbuster 
catastrophes.”  Insurers adapt to these catastrophic risks by raising insurance rates, leading to 
lower loss ratios after the catastrophic event.  There is a widespread event of unexpected 
catastrophes and blockbuster catastrophes that reduces total premiums earned in the state, 
reduces the total number writing insurance coverage in the state, and leads to the exit of firms 
from the state.  Firms with low levels of homeowners’ premiums are most adversely affected by 
the catastrophes. 
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In conventional insurance markets, such as for automobile insurance, the insurer faces a 
large number of independent risks that tend to follow a fairly predictable pattern across time.  By 
charging premiums that the firm can invest and earn a return on before paying off the losses, the 
firm will be able to run a profitable insurance business.   
Catastrophic losses caused by natural disasters are much more problematic from an 
insurance standpoint.  Rather than a large number of risks that on average follow a quite 
predictable year-to-year pattern, catastrophic losses tend to be lumpy.  In fact, the situation 
parallels that in an automobile insurance case in which there is not a large number of 
independent trials but rather a single draw for highly correlated risks so that either every auto or 
no autos are involved in an accident that year.   
Catastrophic risks consequently pose a variety of problems for insurers.  First, because 
the losses arise from a small number of lumpy events, the insurer may not have sufficient 
resources to cover the losses.  Less dramatically, the firm may suffer losses well in excess of the 
value of the premiums that it charged for the coverage.  In the absence of adequate reinsurance, 
the firm may go bankrupt or may choose to exit a state in which there is a substantial exposure to 
such catastrophic risks.  In response to losses incurred following Hurricane Katrina, which 
accounted for over $38 billion in insured losses last year, one major insurer, Allstate, has exited 
several coastal states while another, State Farm, has chosen not to renew some policies in these 
areas.1  The fourth-largest personal insurer in Florida, Poe Financial, went bankrupt.2 
The second ramification of catastrophic losses is that they will influence the rate structure 
even for firms that remain quite viable in the presence of natural disasters.  Suppose that an 
insurer is writing coverage in a very high-risk state that experiences a major disaster once every 
                                                 
1 “The Price of Sunshine,” The Economist, June 8, 2006, p. 76. 
2 Ibid.  More specifically, the article concluded: “In April Poe Financial, Florida’s fourth-largest personal insurer, 
collapsed, leaving 316,000 policyholders in need of coverage.” 
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decade.  In that disaster year, the firm will suffer losses well in excess of premiums.  For it to be 
profitable for the insurer to write coverage in the state, it will consequently have to charge more 
for insurance in the other years in which there are no catastrophes than it would if there were not 
the threat of catastrophic risks.  Thus, one would expect to observe very high loss ratios in the 
catastrophic risk states in years in which a catastrophe has occurred and expect especially low 
loss ratios in the non-catastrophe years as compared to the loss ratios in states not subject to such 
catastrophic risks.   
A third phenomenon linked to natural disasters is that of learning about the risks over 
time.  The distribution of losses due to catastrophes may change over time for a variety of 
reasons.  Locational patterns may have shifted over time, as reflected in increased construction in 
high-risk beachfront locales.  There also may be shifts in weather patterns, as evidenced in the 
recent speculation that catastrophic losses from Hurricane Katrina are likely to increase in the 
presence of global warming. The hurricane season in the period 1995-2005 averaged 15 named 
storms per year, up from an average of 8.5 named storms from 1971-1994.3  To the extent that 
insurers are rational Bayesian decision makers, one would expect them to update their risk 
beliefs over time when writing insurance coverage. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is no econometric analysis whatsoever that addresses these 
and other fundamental aspects of how catastrophic risks affect insurance markets.  There have, of 
course, been extensive discussions of a conceptual nature as well as analyses of the potential role 
of reinsurance, but there has been no empirical examination of how catastrophic risks affect 
insurance company behavior.4 
                                                 
3 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2006). 
4 Examples of previous treatments of the insurance of catastrophic risks include special issues of the Journal of Risk 
and Insurance (December 1996) and the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (April 1997).  Representative 
articles are those by Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer (2004), Angbazo and Narayanan (1996), Gollier (1997), Kleffner 
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This paper will provide a detailed empirical examination of how catastrophic risks affect 
the performance of the market for homeowners’ insurance.  The dataset that we use is 
unprecedented in the homeowners’ insurance literature in terms of its level of detail.  In 
particular, we use information on losses and premiums by firm and by state over a 21-year period 
from 1984 to 2004.  This quite-comprehensive dataset enables us to analyze the effect of 
catastrophic events of differing magnitude and to explore the effects over time in how these 
catastrophic events affected insurance company behavior in subsequent years.   
Section 1 provides some background information regarding catastrophic events arising 
from natural disasters.  That there might be hurricanes in Florida and tornadoes in the Midwest 
should not take insurance companies entirely by surprise.  Thus, we calculate the average 
number of catastrophic events by state, where the number of such events is typically not great, 
but they are not extremely rare events either.  That section also explores what we term 
“blockbuster” catastrophes, which are the twenty most costly natural catastrophes that occurred 
from 1984 to 2004.  These blockbuster events may have particularly dire consequences for 
insurance companies to the extent that these very large losses were not anticipated.   
After reviewing the data sources and the variables used in our analysis in Section 2,  in 
Section 3 we estimate the effect of catastrophic risks on loss ratios, the losses incurred by the 
insurer, and the premiums earned by the insurer.  This analysis will indicate that insurers do in 
fact suffer catastrophic losses in response to catastrophic events, but that they also respond by 
altering their premium structure in the non-catastrophe years.   
In Section 4 of the article, we examine the effects of these catastrophic risks on the size 
of the market in any given state.  Do natural disasters lead firms to exit the market, and what is 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Doherty (1996), and Zeckhauser (1995).  More generally see Viscusi (1993), which focused on liability 
insurance ratemaking in response to the surge in tort liability. 
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their effect on the total number of firms writing insurance coverage in the state?  Are some firms 
particularly vulnerable to the risks of catastrophes, and what are the characteristics of these firms 
that are most at risk?  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1.  Catastrophic Events 
The focus of our empirical analysis is on a series of measures of catastrophic events.  We 
analyze the period from 1984 to 2004, which is the 21-year span covered by our dataset on 
homeowners’ insurance that will be the reference point for our empirical analysis.  The 
catastrophic events were compiled from Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1985 to 2005.  
These Swiss Re figures were in turn based on data from the Property Claims Service (PCS), 
which is a division of the Insurance Services Office (ISO).  The PCS currently defines 
catastrophes as “events that cause $25 million or more in direct insured losses to property that 
affect a significant number of policy holders and insurers.” 
We restrict the definition of catastrophes to natural catastrophes; that is, events which are 
caused by natural forces.  Thus, for example, the consequences of terrorism attacks are not 
included.  Because our concern is with homeowners’ exposure, we exclude those natural 
catastrophes which are more likely to have an impact on commercial lines.  Specifically, we 
account for floods, storms, fires, and earthquakes, but we do not include drought and cold waves.  
We also do not include man-made disasters, such as aviation accidents and explosions, because 
most of these disasters involve commercial exposures or affect only a very limited space.  These 
events also likely involve only a small number of insurance policies as well. 
Our accounting for catastrophic events consequently relies on the selection criteria used 
by Swiss Re.  The threshold for losses included in the Sigma Reports is adjusted annually to 
6 
account for inflation in the United States so that our annual tally of catastrophic events over the 
two-decade period is in comparable inflation-adjusted terms.   
Figure 1 summarizes the number of catastrophic events by year for the 1984 to 2004 
period.  Although catastrophes are not as frequent as, for example, automobile accidents, they are 
not extremely rare events.  In 1996, there were over 200 state-level catastrophic events that met 
the damages threshold.5  Moreover, in just over half of the years shown in the figure, there were 
more than 100 catastrophic events throughout the country.  Note that there was also an upward 
trend in the number of catastrophic events over time.  This trend suggests that either there is 
increased vulnerability to catastrophic events, or that the underlying climatic conditions 
generating these events now pose a greater risk than they did two decades ago. 
The frequency of these catastrophic events varies considerably across different states.  
Table 1 summarizes the average number of catastrophic events per year for each of these states.  
The 21-year period for the analysis provides a reliable long-term perspective on the frequency of 
these risks and is much more informative than, for example, focusing on the results of a single 
year.  Even comparatively safe states, such as Alaska and Hawaii, experience 0.14 catastrophic 
events per year.  Put somewhat differently, these states experienced three catastrophic events 
over the 21-year period shown in the table.  
At the high end of the spectrum is the state of Texas, which averages 7.43 catastrophic 
events annually.  This figure translates into a total of 156 natural disasters over the 21-year 
period, as Texas is very vulnerable to tropical storms as well as tornadoes. 
Insurance companies should have a general sense of the average frequency of 
catastrophic events by state, such as these statistics in Table 1.  Thus, the main concern for 
                                                 
5 Since we focus on insurers’ state-level performance, we account for catastrophes at the state level. Thus, a 
hurricane affecting three states is counted as three catastrophic events, once in each of the three states affected. 
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insurers as well as for subsequent empirical analysis will be the extent to which there is a 
departure in the experience of a particular state from this longer-term average.  If, for example, 
Texas continued to have seven or eight catastrophic events every year and there was no variation 
in this amount, then insurance pricing would be much more stable than if there was a pronounced 
upward trend in the number of catastrophic events.   
The twenty most devastating of these natural catastrophes are those that we term 
blockbuster catastrophes.  Table 2 lists the twenty most costly natural catastrophes over the 
1984-2004 period.  Although the losses associated with Hurricane Katrina dwarf those for the 
catastrophic events shown in Table 2, these disasters also were quite costly.  The most costly of 
the catastrophes was Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which led to an insured loss of $21.5 billion.  
The 1994 Northridge earthquake was not far behind, with a loss of $17.8 billion.  Every one of 
the twenty blockbuster catastrophes shown in Table 2 created a loss of $1.7 billion or more.  
While these losses were often spread across several states, it is noteworthy that some states have 
a prominent role in many of these events.  Florida, for example, is represented in eleven of the 
twenty blockbuster catastrophes. 
Our empirical conjecture is that the incidence of these blockbuster catastrophes will not 
be fully anticipated by the insurers.  As a consequence, we expect there to be a major effect of 
blockbuster effects on insurance pricing as well as exit of insurance companies from the state.  
Blockbuster events by their very nature should be unexpected in terms of their severity.  There 
consequently should be a twofold effect resulting from both a one-time major financial shock as 
well as a longer-term effect as insurance companies revise their risk assessments for the coverage 
that they are writing in these states that are susceptible to blockbuster catastrophes. 
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2.  Data Sources 
The core database that we use for our empirical analysis consists of the state-level 
homeowners’ insurance operations for all U.S. insurers from 1984 to 2004.  We obtained the 
direct premiums earned and losses incurred statistics from the State Pages of insurers’ annual 
filings with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for all insurers with positive 
premiums in the homeowners’ line.  This dataset is also the source of our information on total 
premiums earned in a state, organizational form, and the number of states in which the insurer 
writes homeowners’ coverage. 
The number of firm-state units in the dataset declines steadily through the time period 
analyzed.  Whereas there were 9,644 observations in 1984, by 2004 there were only 6,596 firm-
state units in the dataset.  The number of unique firms in the sample ranges from a high of 1,103 
in 1990 to a low of 961 in 2004.  These figures suggest that firms offering homeowners’ 
coverage have consolidated their operations, electing to provide coverage in fewer and fewer 
states over time, but not exiting the U.S. market. 
Our analysis links an insurer’s state-level homeowners’ experience to catastrophic events 
in the state.  The compilation of catastrophic events at the state level revealed that some states 
are affected by catastrophes on a regular basis.  Anticipated catastrophic events would be 
reflected in premiums if insurers are rational.  Likewise, insurer underwriting performance 
should not be adversely affected by catastrophic events that are anticipated, but would be 
adversely affected by a greater-than-anticipated number of events, and enhanced by a lower-
than-anticipated number of events.  To capture this relationship, we create a variable by year and 
by state called Unexpected Catastrophes.  This variable is defined as the difference between the 
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number of actual catastrophic events in a given year and the average number of catastrophic 
events in that state over the 1984-2004 period.   
The second set of catastrophic variables used are what we call Blockbuster Catastrophes.  
This variable is the number of blockbuster catastrophe events from Table 2 that occurred in that 
state in that particular year.  While all catastrophic events were counted equally in the creation of 
the Unexpected Catastrophes variable, we expect that these blockbuster catastrophes may have a 
differential effect.  Because these events have a more profound effect on insurers’ performance, 
this variable equals the number of blockbuster catastrophic events in the state in which the 
insurer operates for a given year.   
The next set of variables pertains to organizational form.  We have separate variables to 
distinguish whether the firm had a Mutual insurance structure, a Lloyds insurance structure, or 
was a Reciprocal firm.  The omitted category is that of stock firms.6  
We also included four variables that reflect the overall size of the insurance companies’ 
operations.  The three national measures are the Number of States in which the insurer operates, 
the Total Homeowners’ Premiums written by the insurance company throughout the country, and 
the Total National Premiums written by the insurance company in all lines of insurance.  We 
also include Total Premiums in State as a measure of the scale of the firm’s operations within the 
state.  One would expect smaller firms to be more susceptible to shocks than larger firms.  
Moreover, one would expect firms with a substantial presence in the state to be more reluctant to 
leave the state after a catastrophic event because of the losses associated with other lines. 
The final variable we include is a 0-1 variable for Restrictive Rate Regulation.  In these 
states, the firm must obtain prior approval before changing its homeowners’ insurance rates.  We 
                                                 
6 For a review of the effect of organizational form on insurer performance see Born, Gentry, Viscusi, and 
Zeckhauser (1998). 
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expect that a more restrictive state regulatory regime would hinder an insurer’s ability to recover 
financially following a catastrophic event.7  
A major concern in the literature on insurance is how premiums are adjusted over time in 
response to fluctuations in interest rates.  This phenomenon, which is known in the literature as 
the underwriting cycle, is often captured in empirical analyses of insurance markets by including 
some type of interest rate variable.  Our subsequent regression analysis will be more general, in 
that we include time-specific indicator variables for each year in the sample, thus sweeping out 
all time-dependent influences such as interest rate fluctuations and temporal trends in the number 
of firms writing homeowners insurance, as well as any other temporal effects. 
 
3.  Insurance Market Consequences of Catastrophes: Loss Ratios, Premiums, and Losses 
To explore the effects of catastrophic risks, we present a series of regression analyses of 
the effect of these various variables on loss ratios, premiums, and losses.  The loss ratio is the 
first measure that we consider, which is the ratio of losses incurred divided by premiums earned.  
The inverse of the loss ratio is the most widely accepted measure of insurance company 
profitability.   
Figure 2 presents the loss ratio pattern for all homeowners’ insurers over the 1984-2004 
period as well as the pattern for states that are particularly vulnerable to catastrophic risks: 
Florida, California, and Texas.  As one might expect, in these high-risk states, there are often 
spikes in loss ratios that greatly exceed the loss ratios in the homeowners’ lines more generally.  
However, in the years in which there are no big spikes, it is also noteworthy that in these high-
risk states, the loss ratios are very low.  Indeed, for the states of Florida, California, and Texas, in 
most years of the last decade, shown in Figure 2, the loss ratios in these states are substantially 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the effects of rate regulation on property and casualty insurers, see Born (2001). 
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below the average loss ratios for homeowners’ insurance generally.  Our hypothesis is that 
insurers that experience these catastrophic losses and blockbuster events will adjust their pricing 
practices so that the insurance they write in the years in which catastrophic events do not occur 
will be more profitable than insurance written in states not subject to a large number of 
catastrophes.  This additional profitability is needed to compensate for the increased losses that 
these firms experience during the years in which major catastrophes occur.   
Table 3 presents the regression of the natural logarithm of loss ratio on the series of 
explanatory variables.  Specifically, we estimate: 
.YRateReg
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(1) 
for firm i in state s at time t, and where Yj is a dummy variable for each year j=1985-2004.  The 
main hypotheses are that unexpected catastrophes and blockbuster catastrophes should 
substantially boost the loss ratios that firms experience in the catastrophe years and lower loss 
ratios in the non-catastrophe years.   
This basic set of predictions is in fact borne out in the results in Table 3.  There is the 
expected positive effect of the current value of the catastrophe variable as well as the value 
lagged one year.  Notably, two years after the unexpected catastrophe, there is a negative effect 
that is roughly the same size as the estimated standard error.  Thus, the Unexpected Catastrophe 
variable lagged two years is consistent with our pricing hypothesis, but there is no statistically 
significant evidence of such an effect. 
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The subsequent loss ratio offset is more pronounced for blockbuster catastrophes.  The 
effect of blockbuster catastrophes is to boost the loss ratio during the year of the blockbuster 
catastrophe, but there is an opposite and almost offsetting effect two years later.  This result is 
consistent with our hypothesis that after a blockbuster event, firms will raise their insurance 
premiums in order to provide sufficient coverage in case of future blockbuster catastrophes.  
These premium adjustments lead to lower future loss ratios during the years in which a 
blockbuster catastrophe does not strike.  The evidence for such adjustments is much stronger for 
blockbuster catastrophes than for catastrophes more generally. 
Table 4 presents the regression of the log of premiums earned against our set of 
explanatory variables. Specifically, 
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(2) 
 
Premiums reflect both the price of insurance as well as the quantity of insurance, so in 
many respects are a less instructive measure than the loss ratio, which serves as an ex-post 
measure of insurer profitability.  We include a measure of the one-period-lagged homeowners’ 
premiums in the analysis as well to capture the fact that there is a strong autoregressive character 
to insurance underwriting, as firms that write a large number of premiums in the state in a given 
year will tend to continue to do so in subsequent years.  Indeed, the elasticity of premiums 
earned to homeowners’ premiums earned in the previous year is 0.973. 
13 
Catastrophic events have a mixed effect on insurance premiums.  One would expect these 
unexpected catastrophes or blockbuster events to raise the rate that firms charge for insurance.  
Thus, for any given number of policies written, the total premiums will rise.  However, these 
major catastrophes also may reduce the quantity of insurance written, both because of the higher 
rates and insurance rationing, as well as exiting of firms from the state. 
The regression results in Table 4 indicate that the negative quantity effect is dominant.  
Unexpected catastrophes have a negative effect on premiums earned, both in the year of the 
catastrophe as well as in the subsequent year.  Similarly, the blockbuster catastrophes are 
influential as well with a significant negative effect both in the current year as well as two years 
after the catastrophic event. 
The most easily predictable results are those pertaining to losses incurred.  These major 
catastrophes should clearly boost the losses incurred by the insurance company, controlling for 
the scale of the company’s operations, which we do by including the lagged value of the 
homeowners’ premiums written by the company in that state.  We estimate: 
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(3) 
 
The results, shown in Table 5, suggest that unexpected catastrophes raise the value of losses 
incurred, both in the year of the catastrophe as well as in the subsequent year.  About three-
14 
fourths of the influence occurs in the current year, with the remainder occurring with a one-
period lag.   
Blockbuster catastrophes raise the value of losses in the year of the catastrophe, but two 
years later reduce the value of losses.  This effect of reducing losses two years after a catastrophe 
would be expected, to the extent that the blockbuster event leads to either a reduced quantity of 
insurance written or the exit of the firm from the state insurance market altogether.   
 
4.  Effect of Catastrophes on Insurance Firms’ Exit from the State 
The negative effect of catastrophic events on premiums suggests that firms have adapted 
to catastrophic events either by reducing the amount of coverage they write or by exiting the 
state altogether.  In this section we will explore the effect of catastrophes on exit in two ways.  
First, we will examine the effect of catastrophes on the number of firms writing homeowners’ 
insurance coverage in the state.  Second, we will explore what determines a firm’s exit from the 
state and how catastrophes affect these exit decisions. 
If catastrophes were fully anticipated by companies, then we would not expect there to be 
a substantial effect on the exit of firms.  Catastrophes would not lead firms to revise their 
assessments of the risks of writing future homeowners’ insurance coverage in the state.  The 
catastrophic event would function as a fixed cost, so that if it was optimal to write insurance 
coverage previously in the state then it will continue to be profitable to do so.  Because the risks 
were fully anticipated, the premiums will have been set in a manner so that in the long run, the 
insurer will earn sufficient profits to make writing coverage desirable.  If, however, the risks 
were not fully anticipated and catastrophic events lead firms to revise their assessments of the 
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future hazards, then the expectation is that firms will choose either to raise their rates or to exit 
the state.8 
In addition to the effect of catastrophic events on insurance firms’ expectations of future 
losses, there is the additional problem that major catastrophes may generate losses that either 
bankrupt the firm or lead it to exit the state if the firm did not have adequate reinsurance to cover 
these risks.  In terms of an empirical prediction, these effects of catastrophic losses should be 
greatest for firms with the fewest available resources.   
We estimate two equations to assess the effects of catastrophes on the number of firms in  
the state, where the dependent variable in the number of firms in the state. First, we estimate: 
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The results of estimating equation 4 are presented in the first column of Table 6.  The 
first set of variables is the state homeowners’ loss ratio lagged one year and lagged two years.  
Neither measure is found to have a significant effect on a number of firms in the state.  The 
profitability of insurance per se consequently is not influential. 
The next sets of variables pertained to the influence of unexpected catastrophes and 
blockbuster catastrophes in the state, in the previous year and two years earlier.  Unexpected 
catastrophes did not have a significant effect on the number of firms writing homeowners’ 
insurance in the state; however, blockbuster catastrophes do have an influence.  The significant 
effect occurs with a one-period lag, as the occurrence of a blockbuster catastrophe event reduces 
                                                 
8 While insurers may voluntarily leave a state, a catastrophe could also force them to exit the market if they have 
become insolvent. We did not investigate the reason for exit, but note the collapse of at least one large personal lines 
insurer in Florida following hurricane Katrina. (“The Price of Sunshine,” The Economist, June 8, 2006, p. 79). 
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the number of firms writing homeowners’ insurance coverage by 11.  Thus, much of the 
reduction in premiums following blockbuster catastrophes stems from a net decrease in the 
number of firms writing insurance in that state.   
Two state characteristic variables included in the first column in Table 6 are for 
restrictive rate regulation, which reduces the number of firms writing coverage, and the total 
level of state homeowners’ premiums, which, as one might expect, is positively correlated to the 
number of homes in the state.   
The second column in Table 6 explores the influence of possible interactive effects of the 
regulatory regime with the effect of the blockbuster catastrophe variables.  We estimate equation 
4 again, this time including two interaction terms. We find that there is a negative effect on 
market size of blockbuster catastrophes with both a one-period lag and a two-period lag.  Thus, 
the combined effect is to reduce the number of firms writing homeowners’ insurance by 22 
firms, where this result pertains to states that do not have restrictive regulation.  If, however, 
there is a restrictive regulatory regime, as is modeled by the two interactions of Restrictive 
Regulation with the two lagged Blockbuster Catastrophe variables, then this effect is 
substantially reduced.  The statistically significant interaction for the two-period lag of 
blockbuster catastrophes with the restrictive rate regulation variable increases the number of 
firms writing insurance by 19, which offsets most of the influence of the two statistically 
significant blockbuster catastrophe variables.  Although the mechanism for this influence is not 
clear, what may be at work is that in states with restrictive rate regulation, firms are reluctant to 
exit the homeowners’ insurance market in the state because doing so may jeopardize a firm’s 
ability to write coverage in other insurance lines. 
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Whereas the estimates in Table 6 focused on the net effect of exit and entry into the 
homeowners’ insurance market, in Table 7 we will restrict the focus to the probability of exit.  In 
particular, we estimate using a probit analysis: 
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(5) 
 
As with the earlier results, the first column in Table 7 includes a parsimonious set of explanatory 
variables, and we include a variety of interactive effects in the second column.   
The three unexpected catastrophe variables each have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of exit.  The combined influence of these variables is that an 
increase in the number of unexpected catastrophes by 1 increases the probability of exit for the 
average firm in the state by 0.125.   
Whether the catastrophe is a blockbuster catastrophe does not appear to be as influential.  
The negative effect of the contemporaneous blockbuster catastrophe variable is offset by the 
positive effect after a two-year lag, so that on balance, there is no net effect of the blockbuster 
catastrophes above and beyond the influence of the unexpected catastrophe variable. 
The next three variables all pertain to different measures of the scale of the firm’s 
operations.  The first of the scale variables is the total national homeowners’ premiums earned.  
One might expect that large firms would have greater resources, which would diminish their 
incentive to exit.  An effect in the opposite direction is that with substantial homeowners’ 
insurance sales in other states, such large firms can redirect their efforts to more profitable 
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markets.  The net effect is positive, as firms with total national homeowners’ premiums earned 
that are larger are more likely to exit the state.   
If, however, the firm has a substantial stake in writing insurance in the state, the level of 
the state homeowners’ insurance premiums earned will be high and the firm will be more 
reluctant to give up that market, as is indicated by the negative effect of that state total 
homeowners’ premiums earned variable.  The number of states in which the insurer operates has 
a negative effect on exit, so that while writing a large level of homeowners’ premiums increases 
the probability of exit, when these premiums are spread across a large number of markets the 
incentive to exit is reduced. 
The final variables indicate that firms with a mutual, reciprocal, or Lloyd’s structure each 
have a lower probability of exit.  Restrictive state rate regulation increases the probability of exit. 
Many of these variables are of interest with respect to how they interact with the presence 
of the catastrophe.  Thus, the level of state homeowners’ premiums earned or the level of 
national premiums earned will affect the nature of the firm’s response to a catastrophic event.   
The second column of Table 7 includes a large number of these interactions.  Even in the 
presence of these interactive effects, both the contemporaneous and the two-period lag 
unexpected catastrophes variable have a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of exit. 
The final variables included in this equation are a series of six interactions of unexpected 
catastrophes.  Consider first the interactions with total national homeowners’ premiums earned.  
That interaction has a significant negative effect in the year of the catastrophe, a significant 
positive effect with a one-period lag, and a significant positive effect with a two-period lag.  The 
net effect of these influences is positive.  Firms with a high level of total national homeowners’ 
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premiums earned will be more likely to exit the state following a catastrophe.  These are the 
firms with larger potential markets outside the state to which they could direct their efforts.   
Consider next the three interactions with the state local homeowners’ premiums earned.  
This interaction is negative in the year of the catastrophe, statistically insignificant with a one-
period lag, and negative and significant with a two-period lag.  Firms with a large level of state 
homeowners’ premiums earned are less likely to leave the state following a catastrophe.  These 
are the firms that have a substantial investment in insurance operations in the state so that the 
opportunity cost of leaving is greater. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Following natural disasters, there are typically very large losses suffered by individual 
homeowners.  These victims of catastrophes, as well as consumer advocates, frequently assume 
that the challenge that insurers face in dealing with catastrophes should not be great.  That, after 
all, is the purpose of insurance—to provide coverage after such adverse events.  Moreover, if the 
risks involved are quite large, then one would expect these firms to obtain reinsurance coverage 
to address these hazards.   
The analysis here indicates that catastrophic risks pose considerable problems for the 
insurance industry, just as they do for individual homeowners.  To analyze the effect of 
catastrophes, we used an extremely large dataset that consisted of every firm by state by year 
writing homeowners’ insurance coverage in the United States from 1984 to 2004.  Because this 
is the first such examination of the effect of catastrophes using micro data on any major 
insurance market, it provides a unique perspective on how firms respond to these major natural 
catastrophes. 
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The evidence is consistent with insurers not fully anticipating catastrophes and being hit 
particularly hard by the major catastrophes that we term blockbuster catastrophes.  Almost every 
phase of insurance operations is affected by the catastrophic risk.  It is not surprising that both 
the losses incurred and loss ratios each rise in response to catastrophic events.  What is 
interesting is that these natural disasters lead firms to alter their subsequent insurance rates, so 
that the loss ratios in the non-catastrophe years following a catastrophe are lower than they were 
before.  In effect, the firms have updated the assessed risks of a catastrophe and addressed the 
rates that they charge to make writing insurance profitable in the presence of increased assessed 
risks. 
The perhaps more troubling effects pertain to the effect on insurance activities more 
generally.  Catastrophic risks reduce the total premiums earned in the state, which is not a 
reflection of lower rates, but rather a reflection of reduced amounts of insurance coverage that 
people purchase.  One would expect the quantity of coverage to decline as the price of insurance 
rises, but the results indicate that more than this influence is at work.  Catastrophes lead to a 
reduction in the net number of firms writing insurance coverage in the state as well as an 
increase in the probability of exit from the state.  As one would expect, these effects are greatest 
for the firms that are least able to withstand the major financial shock of a catastrophic event.  
Particularly for these firms, the natural disaster is a catastrophic event for the insurer as well as 
for the homeowner who has suffered the catastrophe.9 
                                                 
9 The result that catastrophic events pose problems to the insurance industry is well known to the industry as well.  
Many of the concerns have focused on the effect of catastrophic risks on the affordability and availability of 
insurance in the homeowners’ market.  See Insurance Services Office (1996).  More recently, see the commentary 
by the Insurance Information Institute (2006), which gives an update of the insurance industry concerns relating to 
Hurricane Katrina.   
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Table 1 
Average Annual Catastrophic Events by State, 1984-2004 
 
State Events  State Events  State Events 
        
AK 0.14  LA 3.62  OH 3.76 
AL 3.00  MA 1.52  OK 4.33 
AR 3.10  MD 1.71  OR 0.62 
AZ 0.76  ME 0.52  PA 3.90 
CA 2.19  MI 2.29  RI 0.76 
CO 2.00  MN 1.52  SC 2.43 
CT 1.86  MO 3.76  SD 0.90 
DE 0.90  MS 3.48  TN 3.05 
FL 2.67  MT 0.33  TX 7.43 
GA 3.05  NC 3.10  UT 0.33 
HI 0.14  ND 0.43  VA 2.76 
IA 2.57  NE 2.33  VT 0.67 
ID 0.29  NH 0.62  WA 0.52 
IL 4.90  NJ 2.62  WI 2.00 
IN 4.14  NM 0.71  WV 1.62 
KS 3.81  NV 0.48  WY 0.38 
KY 3.00  NY 3.81    
 
Source: Swiss Re Sigma Reports, 1985-2005. 
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Table 2 
Blockbuster Catastrophes: The Twenty Most Costly Natural Catastrophes 
for U.S. Property Insurers, 1984-2004 
 
Date Peril Insured Loss 
($Billions 
2004 Dollars) 
States Affected 
Aug. 1992 Hurricane Andrew 21.5 FL, LA 
Jan. 1994 Northridge Earthquake 17.8 CA 
Sep. 2004 Hurricane Ivan 11.0 AL, DE, FL, GA, LA, MD, MS, NC, NJ, 
NY, OH, PA, TN, VA, WV 
Aug. 2004 Hurricane Charley 8.0 FL, NC, SC 
Sep. 1989 Hurricane Hugo 6.4 NC, SC 
Aug. 2004 Hurricane Frances 5.0 FL, GA, NC, NY, SC 
Sep. 1998 Hurricane Georges 4.1 AL, FL, MS, LA 
Sep. 2004 Hurricane Jeanne 4.0 DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, NJ, NY, PA, SC, 
VA 
May 2001 Tropical Storm Allison 3.4 FL, LA, GA, MS, NC, NJ, PA, SC, TX 
May 2003 Hailstorms/Tornadoes/ Floods 3.3 AL, AR, CO, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, 
MO, MS, NC, NE, OK, SC, SD, TN 
Sep. 1999 Hurricane Floyd 2.7 CT, FL, DE, GA, MA, MD, ME, NC, 
NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, SC, VT, VA 
Oct. 1995 Hurricane Opal 2.6 AL, FL, GA, MS, NC, SC, TN  
Oct. 1991 Oakland, CA Fires 2.4 CA 
Apr. 2001 Hail/Floods/Tornadoes 2.3 AR, KS, MO, MS, OK, TX  
Mar. 1993 Winter Storm 2.3 AL, CT, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MA, 
MD, ME, MS, NC, NH, NJ, NY, OH, 
PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, VT, WV 
Sep. 1992 Hurricane Iniki 2.2 HI 
Sep. 1996 Hurricane Fran 1.9 MD, NC, OH, PA, SC, VA, WV  
Apr. 2002 Spring Storms/Tornadoes 1.8 GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MD, MO, NY, OH, 
PA, TN, VA, WV 
Sep. 2003 Hurricane Isabel 1.7 DE, MD, NC, NJ, NY, PA, VA, WV 
May 1999 Series of Tornadoes in Midwest 1.7 AL, AR, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, 
MO, MS, NC, NE, OH, OK, SC, TN, TX  
 
Source: Swiss Re. 
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Table 3 
Insurer Loss Ratio Regressionsa 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Intercept -0.910*** 
(0.043) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t 0.060*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-1 0.019*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-2 -0.002 
(0.002) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t 0.120*** 
(0.008) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-1 0.004 
(0.011) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-2 -0.085*** 
(0.012) 
Mutual 0.019** 
(0.008) 
Lloyds -0.038 
(0.043) 
Reciprocal 0.115*** 
(0.019) 
Ln(No. of states in which insurer operates) -0.075*** 
(0.005) 
Ln(Homeowners Premiums) -0.015*** 
(0.002) 
Ln(Total Premiums in State) 0.051*** 
(0.003) 
Ln(Total National Premiums) -0.005* 
(0.003) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation 0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Adjusted R2 0.031 
 
a Dependent Variable = Ln(Loss Ratio) 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, two-tailed test. 
Regression includes 20 year dummies, which are not shown. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results for Insurer Premiumsa 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 
Intercept 
-0.976*** 
(0.035) 
Ln(Homeowners Premiums) t-1 
0.973*** 
(0.001) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t 
-0.027*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-1 
-0.022*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-2 
-0.023*** 
(0.002) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t 
-0.033*** 
(0.007) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-1 
0.013 
(0.009) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-2 
-0.029*** 
(0.010) 
Mutual 
0.156*** 
(0.007) 
Lloyds 
0.241*** 
(0.037) 
Reciprocal 
0.225*** 
(0.017) 
Ln(No. of states in which insurer operates) 
0.088*** 
(0.004) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation 
-0.015*** 
(0.006) 
Ln(Total Premiums in State) 
0.109*** 
(0.002) 
Ln(Total National Premiums) 
-0.041*** 
(0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.896 
 
a Dependent Variable = Ln(Premiums Earned) 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, two-tailed test. 
Regression includes 20 year dummies, which are not shown. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results: Effect of Unexpected Catastrophic Events on Insurer Lossesa 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 
Intercept 
-0.910*** 
(0.043) 
Ln(Homeowners Premiums) t-1 
0.985*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t 
0.060*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-1 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-2 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t 
0.120*** 
(0.008) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-1 
0.004 
(0.011) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-2 
-0.085*** 
(0.012) 
Mutual 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
Lloyds 
-0.038 
(0.043) 
Reciprocal 
0.115*** 
(0.019) 
Ln(No. of states in which insurer operates) 
-0.075*** 
(0.005) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Ln(Total Premiums in State) 
0.051*** 
(0.003) 
Ln(Total National Premiums) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.850 
 
a Dependent Variable = Ln(Losses Incurred) 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, two-tailed test. 
Regression includes 20 year dummies, which are not shown. 
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Table 6 
Regression Estimates of Number of Firms in the State Writing Homeowners’  
Insurance Coveragea 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Intercept 
184.415 
(6.545) 
185.133*** 
(6.510) 
State Homeowners Loss Ratio t-1 
0.607 
(2.863) 
-0.198 
(2.864) 
State Homeowners Loss Ratio t-2 
-0.172 
(2.379) 
-0.271 
(2.365) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-1 
-0.195 
(0.845) 
-0.221 
(0.840) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-2 
1.095 
(0.847) 
1.083 
(0.842) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes in State t-1 
-11.367*** 
(3.550) 
-9.582** 
(4.708) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes in State t-2 
-3.390 
(3.373) 
-12.596*** 
(4.225) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation  
-8.615*** 
(2.678) 
-8.758*** 
(2.671) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation * Blockbuster Catastrophes t-1 
-- 2.242 
(5.670) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation * Blockbuster Catastrophes t-2 
-- 19.387*** 
(5.382) 
Total State Homeowners Premiums ($Millions) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
0.037 
(0.002) 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.370 
 
a Dependent Variable = Number of Firms in State.  Regression includes year dummy variables, 
which are not shown. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, two-tailed test. 
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 Table 7 
Probit Analysis: Effect of Catastrophic Events on Likelihood of Exit 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Intercept 
1.150*** 
(0.066) 
3.298*** 
(0.063) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t 
0.052*** 
(0.003) 
0.180*** 
(0.029) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-1 
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
-0.031 
(0.031) 
Unexpected Catastrophes t-2 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
0.053* 
(0.029) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t 
-0.059*** 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-1 
0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
Blockbuster Catastrophes t-2 
0.048*** 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
Total national homeowners premiums earned ($Billions) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
-- 
State total homeowners premiums earned ($Millions) 
-0.162*** 
(0.003) 
-- 
Number of states in which insurer operates 
-0.159*** 
(0.008) 
-- 
Mutual 
-0.423*** 
(0.017) 
-0.353*** 
(0.018) 
Lloyds 
-0.698*** 
(0.059) 
-0.129 
(0.087) 
Reciprocal 
-0.243*** 
(0.078) 
-0.643*** 
(0.066) 
Ln(Number of states in which insurer operates) 
-- 0.073*** 
(0.007) 
Restrictive Rate Regulation 
0.056*** 
(0.012) 
0.062*** 
(0.013) 
Ln(Total national homeowners premiums) 
-- -0.191*** 
(0.003) 
Ln(State total homeowners premiums earned) 
-- -0.124*** 
(0.003) 
(Ln(Total national homeowners premiums earned) * 
Unexpected Catastrophes) t 
-- -0.003** 
(0.001) 
(State total homeowners premiums earned * Unexpected 
Catastrophes) t 
-- -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
(Total national homeowners premiums earned * Unexpected 
Catastrophes) t-1 
-- 0.004*** 
(0.002) 
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Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
(State total homeowners premiums earned * Unexpected 
Catastrophes) t-1 
-- 0.001 
(0.002) 
(Total national homeowners premiums earned * Unexpected 
Catastrophes) t-2 
-- 0.005*** 
(0.002) 
(State total homeowners premiums earned * Unexpected 
Catastrophes) t-2 
-- -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.168 
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Figure 1 
State-level Catastrophic Events, 1984-2004 
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Figure 2 
Average “Firm-State” Loss Ratios in Homeowners’ Insurance, 1984-2004 
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